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IV

JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a3(2)(j) (1996). This appeal was assigned from the Utah Supreme Court.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Whether the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to grant Defendant a new

trial based on newly-discovered evidence of the decedent's suspected gang affiliation, gang
activity in Pioneer Park, and statements by other witnesses corroborating the reasonableness of
Defendant's fear and belief of necessity to defend himself against decedent. This issue was
preserved at R. 237, 294-300, 755, 759-61, 765-70.
2.

Whether the trial court's failure to provide the jury with the Defendant's requested

lesser-included offense instruction or, if an instruction was not requested, whether defense
counsel's failure to request the instruction was plain and prejudicial error. This issue was
preserved at R. 754, 762-64.
3.

Whether Defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel at trial where

counsel failed to investigate and substantiate victim's gang affiliation; failed to request a lesserincluded offense instruction, if one was in fact not requested; failed to provide Defendant with
documents necessary for trial such as the statements of witnesses; and altogether failed to
examine several of the State's witnesses. This issue was preserved at R. 236-37, 294-300, 755,
770-76.
4.

Whether the Defendant was denied due process of law because the State failed to

disclose important exculpatory evidence to the Defendant prior to trial. This issue was preserved
at R. 755, 776-78.

5.

Whether Defendant's conviction should be reversed because there was insufficient

evidence of Defendant's intent to commit criminal homicide murder.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Because there are several issues presented for review, there are different standards of
review this Court should apply to each of those issues.
As to whether the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to grant Defendant a new
trial based on important newly-discovered evidence, trial judges are only afforded "some
deference" in determining if the newly-discovered evidence merits granting a new trial. See
State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936-37 (Utah 1994). This is the appropriate standard because such a
determination involves a mixed question of fact and law—i.e., whether the newly-discovered
evidence meets three legal criteria: "(1) It must be such as could not with reasonable diligence
have been discovered and produced at trial; (2) it must not be merely cumulative; and (3) it must
be such as to render a different result probable on the retrial of the case." State v. Gellatly, 449
P.2d 993, 996 (Utah 1969); accord State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 793 (Utah 1991). Because the
facts surrounding this issue are undisputed (the newly-discovered evidence itself), this Court
should give no particular deference to the trial court's ruling.
"An appeal challenging the refusal to give jury instructions presents a question of law
only." State v. Peterson, 802 P.2d 1328, 1331 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). Therefore, this Court
should "grant no particular deference "to the trial court's failure" to instruct the jury regarding a
lesser-included offense.

Whether Defendant was denied his constitutionally guaranteed effective assistance of
counsel is an ultimate legal question and is subject to de novo review. See State v. Periy, 899
P.2d 1232, 1239 (Utah Ct. App. 1995).
A prosecutor's failure to produce exculpatory evidence warrants reversal if a review of
the record persuades the Court that, without the error, there was a reasonable likelihood of a
more favorable result for the defendant. See State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 916 (Utah 1987).
Moreover, it is the State's burden "to persuade the court that there is no reasonable likelihood
that absent the error, the outcome of the trial would have been more favorable for the defendant."
M a t 917.
Finally, as to whether there was sufficient evidence to support Defendant's intent to
commit criminal homicide murder, this Court reviews the trial court's findings of fact under a
"clearly erroneous" standard. See Gillmore v. Cummings, 904 P.2d 703, 706 (Utah Ct. App.
1995).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case,

Defendant Michael Whiteman appeals a final judgment of conviction of criminal
homicide entered April 5, 1999 in the Third Judicial District Court, and the denial of his Motion
for New Trial and/or Resentencing on March 10, 1997.
B,

Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below.

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of criminal homicide (UTAH CODE ANN. § 765-203 (1953)) on September 3, 1993. Defendant filed motions for a new trial based on significant
newly-discovered evidence which supported his testimony of self-defense. This motion was

denied on March 10, 1997. On April 9, 1997, Defendant appealed his conviction and the denial
of his motion for new trial. The Utah Supreme Court vacated the sentence and remanded for
sentencing "de novo." Defendant then renewed his motion for a new trial and also moved the
trial court for reduction of his sentence by one degree.
On April 5, 1999, the trial court denied the motions for a new trial and to reduce the
sentence one degree. Defendant again received a sentence of five years to life and the Third
Judicial District Court entered a final judgment of conviction of criminal homicide.
Defendant now appeals the Third Judicial Court's final judgment of criminal homicide
and the denial of his motion for a new trial.
C.

Statement of Facts.

1.

Evidence at trial.

The Pioneer Park area of downtown Salt Lake City is historically renowned for its
abundance of criminal activities there in the past, including drug deals, severe beatings and
assaults. (Trial Tr. 8/31/93 at 236-39; 9/1/93 at 134-36, 195-200, 207-09, 230-31; 9/2/93 at 78,
107-15, 193-95.) The Pioneer Park area is also known for its history of gang
violence—specifically, groups of Mexican Nationals working in gangs to severely beat or even
kill white people. (Trial Tr. 9/1/93 at 196-98; 9/2/93 at 83-87, 193-95, 217-25.)
The Defendant, Michael Whiteman, a white homeless man, moved to Salt Lake City
sometime in 1991 and resided on the streets of Salt Lake City until April 26, 1993. (Trial Tr.
9/2/93 at 63-64.) While living on the streets, the Defendant visited the Pioneer Park area
frequently, where he observed several occasions of brutal beatings, attacks, and even murders.
(Trial Tr. 9/2/93 at 72-76.) The Defendant encountered several instances of gang beatings, where
A

several Mexican Nationals would gang up on an individual and beat him severely. (Trial Tr.
9/2/93 at 84-87.)
One such Mexican National, Jose Antonio Lopez (a.k.a. "Diablo"), was well-known for
his violent character and his involvement in numerous gang beatings. (Trial Tr. 9/1/93 at 196,
218; 9/2/93 at 20, 24-28, 219-23, 228.) Lopez was also known for his hatred of white people and
his drunkenness. (Trial Tr. 9/1/93 at 195-96; 9/2/93 at 83-85, 219-23.)
On April 26, 1993, Lopez approached the Defendant Whiteman, offering him drugs.
When Whiteman declined, Lopez attempted to provoke a fight with Whiteman as he sat in the
Park with State's witness Clifton Jones and others, minding their own business. (Trial Tr. 9/1/93
at 198-200; 9/2/93 at 91-114.) During this incident, Lopez was alone and Whiteman's sheathed
knife lay in plain view by his side. (Trial Tr. 9/1/93 at 158-59, 161-62; 9/2/93 at 96-98.)
Lopez made some derogatory comments, to which Whiteman responded. (Trial Tr.
9/1/93 at 159-65; 9/2/93 at 96-98.) Mr. Jones asked Whiteman and Lopez to take their dispute
elsewhere. (Trial Tr. 9/1/93 at 161, 200.) At that time, Whiteman got up and walked away from
Lopez. (Trial Tr. 9/1/93 at 158-65, 205-06; 9/2/93 at 98-105.)
Although the Defendant attempted to walk away from Lopez, Lopez continued to pursue
and harass the Defendant until finally the two of them separated into different areas of the Park.
(Trial Tr. 9/1/93 at 181, 206-07; 9/2/93 at 98-100.) Later, while the Defendant was relaxing
under a tree, Lopez returned once again, this time with back-up. (Trial Tr. 8/31/93 at 207, 214;
9/2/93 at 100-08; 199-200 .) Whiteman's knife was stuck in the ground beside the tree where
Whiteman sat. (Trial Tr. 9/2/93 at 103.) Lopez and his friends continued to antagonize
Whiteman until Whiteman stood up. Lopez boasted to Whiteman that he was going to kill him.

(Trial Tr. 9/2/93 at 110.) Suddenly, Lopez punched the Defendant so hard in the face that it
caused the Defendant to fall to the ground and opened a sizeable wound in his head. (Trial Tr.
8/31/93 at 214-15, 225-26, 257-58; 9/2/93 at 114-16, 199-201, 227-28.)
Based upon Defendant's having seen white men being "rat-packed" and beaten severely
by gangs in the Park, and seeing Lopez "backed up" by several friends, Whiteman feared that if
he landed on the ground he would be severely beaten or even killed. (Trial Tr. 9/2/93 at 114-16,
72-76, 84-87.) Other witnesses testified that had they been in Whiteman's situation, they also
would have believed they would be "rat-packed" and severely beaten or killed, based upon their
prior experiences in the Park. (Trial Tr. 9/1/93 at 197-200; 9/2/93 at 194-200, 203, 223-25.) As
he fell to the ground, Whiteman reached back to catch the ground. He pulled the knife out of the
ground, and thrust it forward in self defense, stabbing Lopez in the chest. (Trial Tr. 9/2/93 at
116-17,122-25,201.)
State's witness Robert Young was walking through the Park to his work. He testified that
when Lopez approached the Defendant with his friends, the Defendant stood up with his hands
up "ready to fight." (Trial Tr. 8/31/93 at 225.) However, Mr. Young also testified that it was
also possible that the Defendant had his hands up in order to defend himself, rather than to start a
fight. (Trial Tr. 8/31/93 at 253-54.) Moreover, he stated Lopez was the one who hit the
Defendant first in the face and that the Defendant did not have the knife in his hand when he was
hit in the face by Lopez. (Trial Tr. 8/31/93 at 226.) Mr. Young then testified that after Lopez hit
the Defendant in the face, the Defendant grabbed an object from the ground and stabbed Lopez in
the chest as Lopez was backing up with his hands raised. (Trial Tr. 8/31/93 at 226-34.)

State's witness Elizabeth Woods provided a confusing and incomprehensible account of
what she witnessed in the Park on April 26, 1993. Ms. Woods was driving in her car East on the
4th South viaduct and claims she was looking into the Park. Ms. Woods testified that it took her
seven minutes to wait for a red traffic light and to drive one block at 25-30 miles an hour, while
she paid attention to the traffic in front of and around her and watched the incident at the same
time. (Trial Tr. 9/1/93 at 73, 105-10.) She described seeing people that no other witness
remembered seeing in the Park that day. (Trial Tr. 9/1/93 at 76-77, 115-16.) Most importantly,
throughout Ms. Woods' testimony, she repeatedly confused her answers as to who was actually
present during the incident, who were the primary participants and which person did what. (Trial
Tr. 9/1/93 at 88-101, 116-17.)
Immediately after stabbing Lopez the Defendant was attacked by several persons at the
scene, who hit him several times with various objects, including rocks, sticks, bottles and even a
green metal fence post. (Trial Tr. 9/1/93 at 190-91, 214-15; 9/2/93 at 117-21, 201-02.) As the
Defendant backed away from the group of attackers, police officers arrived and Defendant was
taken into custody, perhaps saving his life. (Trial Tr. 9/2/93 at 120-21.)
Witness Harry J. Lee claimed that he saw and spoke with the Defendant that same
morning and that the Defendant told him "he was going to pick up his knife" and that "he had
this problem at the Park that he was going to get straight after he got his knife." (Trial Tr.
8/31/93 at 178-79.) However, Mr. Lee provided four different dates as the date he had this
conversation with the Defendant and stated that he did not sense any immediate danger as a
result of this conversation. (Trial Tr. 8/31/93 at 185-89.) Despite the prosecution's attempt to
have the jury infer the Defendant was referring to the "business" of killing Lopez with the knife,

the Defendant did not use his knife in any threatening manner whatsoever while Lopez was alone
and provoking the Defendant that day. Whiteman only used his knife in self defense after being
knocked to the ground by Lopez. (Trial Tr. 9/1/93 at 158-165, 205-06; 9/2/93 at 98-105.)
2.

New Evidence of Defendant's Self-Defense Not Reasonably Discoverable
Before Trial

At the trial, the State's witness, Officer Robinson claimed that there was no organized
gang activity in Pioneer Park but admitted people often gathered in groups according to race and
defended members of their group. (Trial Tr. 9/2/93 at 262-65.) After the Defendant's trial had
concluded, new evidence was discovered by Defendant which further establishes the reality and
reasonableness of the Defendant's fear for his life and Lopez's involvement in a violent street
gang. This evidence was presented in Defendant's Motion for New Trial, argued March 10,
1997, (R. at 759-61) and resubmitted in support of Defendant's motion for reduction of his
sentence. (R. at 1093-96.)
New evidence disclosed that the symbols "SUR" were tattooed on the body of Lopez,
substantiating Defendant's belief that Lopez was supported by an organized street gang as backup. (R. at 828.) The symbol "SUR" is the moniker for, and identified Lopez's affiliation with,
the violent street gang, "Surenos." (R. at 793-95.) A five pointed star, also tattooed on the body
of Lopez, is also a popular gang symbol. (R. at 793-95, 828.) The significance and existence of
the gang tattoos was either known or should have been known by the police but was not
disclosed to the Defendant until after the conclusion of the trial. (R. at 783-84, 1013-14.) The
Defendant was never given access to review the medical examiner's autopsy report on the body
of Lopez. (R. at 1013-14.)

The identity and involvement of another Hispanic witness in the Park that day was also
discovered after the trial and was not available to the Defendant prior to or during the trial. (R. at
799-822, 830-65.) Julian Valdez ("Valdez") admitted to Defendant and authorities that he had
been in Pioneer Park on April 26,1993. (R. at 800-01, 804-05, 830.) In three recorded
interviews, Valdez stated that he and several others were recruited by Lopez to "back him up"
while Lopez was going to "down Whiteman." (Id.) Valdez would also have testified that Lopez
was frequently involved in fights, and used weapons in those fights, and had a reputation as an
aggressive trouble-maker and fighter. (R. at 834, 848-50.) Valdez's testimony as an Hispanic,
would have persuasively supported Whiteman's self-defense theory and evidence that there was
a recruited, organized group to back up Lopez on April 26, 1993. (R. at 800-06, 810, 846, 858.)
Other evidence obtained by police detectives was not disclosed to the Defendant or his
counsel until after his trial and conviction. For example, William Schultz, an undisclosed eye
witness, stated that the stabber had tattoos, (which Whiteman does not) but confirmed that
another Mexican was with Lopez, contradicting prosecution testimony at trial. (R. at 521-22.)
Bernard Towns stated that "two Mexicans" approached the Defendant in the Park—Lopez wore a
white shirt and his companion wore a red shirt and cap worn backwards. (R. at 519-20.) Finally,
eyewitness Charles Drake reported that there were so many of the Mexican guys against the
Defendant and that one of them wielded a fence post. (R. at 524.)
Police investigators also obtained a statement from Gilmore Francis Pinelo, one of those
who accompanied Lopez on April 26, 1993. (R. at 908-16.) After the trial, Mr. Pinelo met the
Defendant in jail and also admitted to the Defendant that he had been asked by Lopez at the Park

to back him up and to "down" the Defendant. (R. at 1014-15.) The jury should have had the
opportunity to assess and weigh the credibility of Mr. Pinelo.
Finally, Defendant discovered that Mr. Robert Young, a key prosecution eyewitness, had
been charged with driving under the influence shortly before the Defendant's trial. (R. at 82326.) After the trial unknown to the Defendant or his counsel, and not disclosed by the
prosecution, Mr. Young was given a deal by the State in exchange for his testimony against the
Defendant in August, 1993. The docket of the Third Circuit Court, State v. Young, D1623 78
shows that $300.00 of Mr. Young's fine and 150 hours of his community service were waived
after the Defendant Whiteman's trial. {Id.)
3.

Prosecution's Failure to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence

Prior to the trial, the State failed to disclose critical evidence of Lopez's gang affiliation
indicated by the tattoos on his body found by the State's employees. The "Surenos" gang
affiliation directly supports the Defendant's testimony that he believed Lopez was backed by
several others. If this evidence was known to the State, failure to produce it prior to trial was
prejudicial error.
Moreover, police reports indicate that Officer Newman took the name of the individual
(Pinelo) who wore a red shirt and baseball cap backwards and was standing with Lopez during
the altercation on April 26,1993. (R. at 526, 528.) This critical evidence from a participant was
not disclosed to the Defendant or his counsel despite the State's knowledge of the evidence and
its direct correlation to the defense.

10

Statements of other eyewitnesses such as William Schultz, Bernard Towns and Charles
Drake were also not disclosed to Defendant or his counsel. Each of these witnesses would have
offered further support of Defendant's testimony that he reasonably acted in self-defense.
4,

Evidence of Ineffectiveness of Defendant's Trial Counsel

On several occasions, Defendant's counsel either failed to interview crucial potential
witnesses in Pioneer Park that day or failed to adequately cross-examine key prosecution
witnesses. For example, defense counsel failed to present the significant testimony of Bernard
Townes, who stated that two Mexicans approached the suspect; the dead man was wearing a
white shirt and the other one had on a red shirt and cap. (R. at 519-20.) Defense counsel also
failed to discover and/or offer the testimony of Mr. Shultz and Charles Drake which supported
the Defendant's belief that his life was in danger. ( R. at 521-22, 524.)
Defense counsel also failed to follow-up with and investigate and/or cross exam Mr.
Young, regarding his drunk driving conviction and the leniency later given, especially when his
testimony was inconsistent. (See Affidavit, R. 1126.) Moreover, regarding the cross
examination of Ms. Woods, defense counsel failed to cross examine her on clear inconsistencies
in her trial testimony and testimony given at the preliminary hearing. Had defense counsel
pointed out this inconsistency, Defendant's testimony would have seemed more credible, and the
State's version less credible. Ms. Woods' testimony describing the actual altercation between
the Defendant and Lopez was grossly inconsistent and defense counsel failed to point out any
inconsistency whatsoever in her description. (Trial Tr. 9/1/93 at 88-101, 116-17.)
Moreover, if the evidence discovered after the trial was available to defense counsel prior
to the conclusion of the trial, counsel then failed to investigate, discover, and present such
11

evidence at trial. For example, if the medical examiner's report (Add. A) showing the tattoos on
Lopez's body was available to defense counsel, the nature and significance of those tattoos
should have been discovered and presented at trial as independent support of Defendant's
reasonableness to believe that Lopez had backup and Whiteman was about to be "rat-packed."
Defense counsel also failed to present important mitigating evidence both at trial and
sentencing, which would likely have significantly reduced Defendant's sentence. For example,
counsel did not submit any evidence of Lopez's gang affiliation, even after specifically being
asked to do so by the Defendant. Moreover, defense counsel did not submit any mitigating
evidence of Defendant's mental and emotional deficiencies at the time, or of his organic mental
disorders. Dr. Ralph W. Gant stated in an April 22, 1993 medical report on Mr. Whiteman that:
"Basically the psycho graph indicates significant deficits in long term memory, short term
memory, impulse control, judgment, abstract and logical thinking, ability to attend to detail,
capacity for memorization and visual motor coordination." (R. at 789-90.)
5.

Evidence of Request for Lesser-Included Offense Instruction

On August 24, 1993, Defendant's counsel filed their Requested Jury Instructions. (R. at
81-114.) Included therein was the following requested instruction: "Should you find from the
evidence that the defendant is guilty of an offense included within the charge brought against
him, but you entertain a reasonable doubt as to the severity of the offense committed, you are
instructed to find the defendant guilty of the lesser included offense only." (Add. B, R. at 113.)
Moreover, defense counsel argued to the court at the conclusion of the prosecution's case
that the evidence did not establish a prima facie case of homicide, and at best, only presented a
case of manslaughter. (Trial Tr. 9/2/93 at 1-3.)
1?

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court abused its discretion in not granting Defendant a new trial after significant
new evidence going to the heart of Defendant's theory of the case was discovered subsequent to
the trial. The newly discovered evidence would have further substantiated Defendant's
testimony that he was indeed going to be "rat-packed" and that Lopez intended to make good on
his threat to kill Defendant on April 26, 1993. The trial court erroneously weighed the credibility
of the new evidence rather than properly determining if a different result would be probable
should the jury find the evidence to be true. In applying this erroneous standard, the trial court
reached an erroneous decision.
The newly discovered evidence included clear evidence that Lopez was involved in a
dangerous street gang of Mexican Nationals and that he had enlisted others to "down" or "kill"
the Defendant, and evidence that the key State's witness, Robert Young, received leniency for his
testimony would have severely damaged his credibility with the jury.
This evidence was not reasonably discoverable before or during the trial. The new
evidence is of a different kind and nature than other evidence offered at trial. Given the nature
and extent of the new evidence, together with the evidence that was properly admitted at the trial,
there is a strong possibility that the jury would have rendered a different result in the case if the
new evidence is true.
The trial court also committed plain and prejudicial error when it failed to provide the
jury with the requested lesser-included offense instruction for manslaughter. Here, the offenses
of criminal homicide and manslaughter overlap and the jury heard substantial evidence that the
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Defendant reasonably acted in self-defense. Thus, it was error for the court not to give the
requested lesser-included offense instruction.
The record clearly shows Defendant's requested instruction and the trial record is void of
evidence that Defendant waived the right to the instruction. Defense counsel never obtained
approval to waive the right to a lesser-included offense instruction. Therefore, Defendant
maintained his right to the lesser-included offense instruction which was properly submitted to
the trial court.
To the extent that the new evidence is not deemed "newly discovered" and that the lesserincluded offense instruction was not requested, Defendant was denied his constitutionally
protected right to effective assistance of counsel. Defense counsel failed to investigate and
interview important potential witnesses that would have supported Defendant's theory of the case
and contradicted the State's witnesses. Furthermore, to the extent that a lesser-included offense
instruction was not requested, the failure to so request could not be considered a valid trial tactic,
especially given that Defendant's entire theory of the case was that he acted in self-defense.
Finally, defense counsel's failure to adequately cross examine State's witnesses Woods and
Young regarding obvious inconsistencies in their prior statements, and leniency given to Young
for his testimony, severely prejudiced Defendant. These actions fell below any reasonable
standard of professional judgment and profoundly prejudiced Defendant before the jury.
Moreover, the State failed to fulfill its constitutional duty to disclose exculpatory
evidence to Defendant, thus undermining confidence in the outcome of the trial. The State failed
to disclose names of several exculpatory witnesses, evidence of Lopez' gang affiliation,
statements obtained from several eyewitnesses and the fact that Robert Young, the State's key
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witness, was charged with driving under the influence and given leniency in exchange for his
testimony. Because the State failed to disclose this information, it has the burden of showing
that there is not a reasonable likelihood of a different result had the information been disclosed.
Finally, the jury was not presented with sufficient evidence to support a verdict of
criminal homicide murder. Given the substantial amount of evidence indicating that Defendant
reasonably believed he would suffer severe bodily harm or death when he stabbed Lopez, no
reasonable jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt, that the State had shown that
Defendant did not act in self-defense. Given the nature and extent of evidence presented to the
jury regarding the history of gang beatings and murders in Pioneer Park, the subjective
knowledge and experiences of the Defendant, the reputation of Lopez as a violent troublemaker
and the fact that Lopez initiated two altercations with Defendant and punched Defendant in the
face knocking him to the ground, it cannot be said that the prosecution proved, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that Defendant did not act in self-defense.
ARGUMENT
L

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO GRANT
DEFENDANT A NEW TRIAL BASED ON THE SIGNIFICANT NEWLYDISCOVERED EVIDENCE
The trial court abused its discretion in refusing to grant the Defendant a new trial after

new evidence going to the heart of Defendant's self-defense theory and gang activity of the
victim had been discovered subsequent to the conclusion of the trial. Because the district court's
refusal to grant a new trial based on this important newly-discovered evidence involves a mixed
question of fact and law, it is only entitled to "some deference" from this Court. See State v.
Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936-37 (Utah 1994). Thus, if this Court finds that the new evidence meets
1^

the requirements of the rule of law outlined below, Defendant's motion for new trial should be
granted.
In order to constitute grounds for a new trial, new evidence must meet three
requirements: "(1) It must be such as could not with reasonable diligence have been discovered
and produced at trial; (2) it must not be merely cumulative; and (3) it must be such as to render a
different result probable on the retrial of the case." State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 793 (Utah
1991) (quoting State v. Gellatly, 449 P.2d 993, 996 (Utah 1969)). If the newly discovered
evidence meets these three requirements, Defendant should receive a new trial such that the trier
of fact can weigh the new evidence along with that already introduced. This Court has
previously stated that:
While the granting or refusing of [a motion for new trial] lies in the
sound discretion of the court, where there is a grave suspicion that
justice may have miscarried because of the lack of enlightenment
on a vital point which new evidence will apparently supply, and
the other elements attendant on obtaining a new trial on the ground
of newly discovered evidence are present, it would be an abuse of
sound discretion not to grant the same.
James, 819 P.2d at 794 n.41 (quoting State v. Duncan, 132 P.2d 121, 125 (Utah 1942)).
After argument of the new trial motion and renewed motions, the trial court stated that
there was newly discovered evidence that Whiteman acted in self defense. However, the trial
court stated that the new evidence "would not probably result in a different verdict upon a new
trial." (R. at 1042.) The court also stated that:
I'm going to find that the new evidence is insufficient to get
around the problem that Mr. Young creates for the defense. ...
[T]he jury sat and judged his credibility when he said that the
victim backed up with his hands up, open palms, that if the jury
found him a credible witness, the rest of the information, whether

or not the victim was a gang member, whether or not others were
backing him up, is sufficient to support the jury verdict.
(Tr. of Proceedings 4/5/99 at 69-70.) Hence, the court made the improper finding that the
evidence, as presented to the jury, was sufficient to support the verdict. What the court should
have done however, is evaluate the new evidence and determine whether a different result would
be probable if the jury were to believe the new evidence.
The newly-discovered evidence of Lopez's gang involvement goes to the heart of the
Defendant's defense and the reasonableness of his belief that he feared being ambushed by
several Mexican Nationals. Julian Valdez, an Hispanic witness, would directly confirm what the
Defendant believed on April 26, 1993—that Lopez had recruited others in the Park that day to
back him up in his attempt to "down" or "kill" the Defendant. Testimony of other eyewitnesses,
also not disclosed to the Defendant prior to the trial, further confirms the Defendant's testimony
that there were several Mexican Nationals there to defend Lopez. Testimony regarding Gilmore
Francis Pinelo ("Pinelo"), and statements from Pinelo himself, provide strong support for the
reasonableness of the Defendant's fear. Finally, evidence whether key prosecution witness,
Robert Young, cut a deal with the prosecution in exchange for his testimony would have
influenced the juror's opinion of that testimony, especially given the fact that Judge Thorne
placed great weight on the credibility of Mr. Young's testimony in finding that the evidence was
sufficient to support the verdict. This evidence could not have been discovered with reasonable
diligence, would not have been "merely cumulative," and in sum, would probably have rendered
a different result in the case.
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A.

The New Evidence Was Not Reasonably Discoverable by the Defense Before
Trial

First, the evidence of Lopez's Surenos' gang affiliation, evidenced by his tattoos, was not
reasonably discoverable by the Defendant absent the prosecution disclosing such evidence. This
evidence was either known or should have been known to the police, yet was not revealed to the
Defendant or his counsel. The Defendant did not learn of the "SUR" tattoo from the medical
examiner's report and the significance of the tattoo until December 20, 1993, after the trial. (R.
at 1013-14.) The tattoo evidenced Lopez's affiliation with one of the most dangerous street
gangs originating in Southern California.
Secondly, the testimony of Julian Valdez was also not reasonably discoverable by the
Defendant prior to trial. Although Valdez was present in Pioneer Park on April 26, 1993, he was
nowhere to be found when police arrived at the scene. His existence was unknown to Defendant.
It was not until after the trial, on September 22, 1993 while Valdez was incarcerated in Salt Lake
City jail, that he came forward and admitted that Lopez had recruited his assistance to "down" or
kill the Defendant. The Defendant could not reasonably be expected to locate and obtain
Valdez's testimony prior to trial.
Other new evidence uncovered by the Defendant after the trial includes statements from
other eyewitnesses and from Gilmore Francis Pinelo, whose testimonies would have further
supported Defendant's testimony of self defense. Statements of the witnesses were not produced
to the Defendant until after his trial and conviction and were not reasonably discoverable prior to

trial.
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Finally, evidence impeaching Robert Young, a key eyewitness for the prosecution, was
also not available to the Defendant until after the trial. Mr. Young was arrested for driving under
the influence of alcohol and given a deal by the prosecution in exchange for his favorable
testimony. His drunk driving arrest occurred just two months prior to the trial. The apparent
resulting deal between the State and Young (waiver of Mr. Young's fine and dropping his
community service hours) was not disclosed to the Defendant or discoverable until after the trial.
(R. 1160.) To properly evaluate his testimony, the jury was entitled to hear and consider that
Young would get off his DUI conviction without paying his fine or performing other terms of his
sentence.
The newly discovered evidence supported Defendant's case and was not reasonably
discoverable before trial. In the alternative, if the evidence was discoverable, then Defendant
was denied his constitutional right to effective counsel because counsel should have investigated
and presented this evidence to the jury.
B.

The Newly-Discovered Evidence is not "Merely Cumulative"

The new evidence proffered cannot be considered "merely cumulative" of other evidence.
A court will not grant a new trial based on newly-discovered evidence if the evidence is found to
be "merely cumulative." See State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 793 (Utah 1991) (quoting State v.
Gellatly, 449 P.2d 993, 996 (Utah 1969)). However, "[e]vidence from a neutral third party is not
merely cumulative of a criminal defendant's testimony. It is of a different kind and nature than
defendant's statements, and it certainly could have a different quality in the eyes of the jurors
who assess the credibility of the witnesses." See id. at 794 (emphasis added). The new evidence
regarding Lopez's gang affiliation, testimony of Pinelo and Valdez, both Hispanics, that they

were indeed asked to back Lopez up in his attempt to "down" the Defendant, and evidence of
bias on the part of Mr. Young cannot be considered "merely cumulative."
The newly-discovered evidence here is of a different kind and quality than the testimony
of the Defendant and contradicts testimony of State's witnesses. There was no evidence of
Lopez's gang affiliation introduced at trial because such gang affiliation was unknown to the
Defendant. All Defendant knew and testified to was that he had seen other Anglos "rat-packed"
by gangs of Mexican Nationals in the past and that Lopez had others backing him up. The State
even presented the testimony of Officer Robinson claiming that there were not any organized
groups in Pioneer Park. (Trial Tr. 9/2/93 at 262-65.) That testimony could have been directly
countered by Sargent Chuck Gilbert that Surenos gang members do carry out their drug deals in
the park. (Add. C, R. 795.) Moreover, there had not been supporting evidence at trial by those
actually asked by Lopez to help him "down" the Defendant—only the belief of Defendant that
others were backing Lopez up.
The newly discovered evidence from Valdez, Pinelo and the significance of Lopez's
tattoo and gang-affiliation clearly would have rendered Officer Robinson's opinion entirely
incredible. The newly-discovered evidence which supported Defendant's motion for new trial
should not be considered merely cumulative. The evidence was of a "different kind and nature"
from Defendant's own testimony about his fear and anxiety.
As this Court has stated previously:
The purpose of a trial is to obtain the facts. If testimony is
available which would tend to show the innocence of a defendant,
the court and counsel for both sides should aid in the presentation
of such testimony to prevent a miscarriage of justice. The jury
should be aided in every reasonable manner to obtain all of the

competent material and relevant facts essential to enable the jurors
to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused.
State v. Duncan, 132 P.2d 121, 125 (Utah 1942). The jury in this case was not provided with
significant evidence relevant to the vital issue of self defense and the reasonableness of
Defendant's fear. It would be a miscarriage of justice to prevent the Defendant from presenting
this crucial evidence to a trier of fact.
C.

Given This Newly-Discovered Evidence, it is Probable that the Jury Would
Have Had a Reasonable Doubt as to Defendant's Guilt

Because the newly-discovered, independent evidence directly confirms the Defendant's
self-defense and the reasonableness for his fear for his life, Defendant submits that it is highly
probable that the jury would have decided differently had they been presented with the evidence.
Newly-discovered evidence must "render a different result probable on the retrial of the case."
State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 793 (Utah 1991) (quoting State v. Gellatly, 449 P.2d 993, 996
(Utah 1969)). Because evidence of Defendant's intent or knowledge to kill is scant and
circumstantial at best, the newly-discovered evidence which controverts such evidence and
supports the Defendant's reasonable belief of his need to defend his life would likely have
resulted in the Defendant's acquittal.
When considering whether newly-discovered evidence would probably lead to a different
result, a trial court should not determine whether the jury would believe the evidence or not.
Rather, the court should only determine if a different result would be probable if the jury were
find the evidence to be true. See State v. Duncan, 132 P.2d 121, 124 (Utah 1942) (stating,
"There would be no merit in the statutory authorization ... to grant a new trial by reason of newly
discovered evidence . . . if the trial court had to be certain the jury would believe the newly
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discovered evidence") Here, the State has never argued that the tattoo evidence or the Valdez
and Pinelo testimony is not true. Assuming that the new evidence is true, there is a strong
probability that the trial would have concluded differently.
In considering whether to grant a new trial based on newly-discovered evidence, this
court should only examine the evidence "to determine its relation to the substance of the moving
party's defense." State v. Ames, 730 P.2d 1064, 1067 (Idaho Ct. App. 1986). Defendant's newly
discovered evidence is directly related to and supports the Defendant's defense— (1) that the
Defendant reasonably acted in self-defense and, (2) that Lopez was prepared to make good on his
threats and promises to kill Whiteman. Had jurors been presented with the evidence of Lopez's
gang affiliation and testimony of Valdez, Pinelo and others, they would have likely returned a
verdict of not guilty by reason of Defendant's self defense.
The Defendant testified that similar types of fights between the Mexican nationals and
others frequently occurred and resulted in beatings, because when you fought one of them, you
fought them all. (Trial Tr. 9/2/93 at 72-76; 84-87.) The Defendant reasonably believed that if he
fell to the ground, he would not be allowed to rise and would be severely beaten, if not killed. In
fact, Lopez told Whiteman that he was a "dead man." (Trial Tr. 9/2/93 at 114-16.) The Valdez
testimony confirms Whiteman's evidence and his belief that Lopez had back up and prepared to
carry out his threat. The new testimony does not just support Defendant's testimony, it confirms
its truthfulness and reasonableness. Although there was other evidence that Defendant acted in
self defense, the new evidence would be far more persuasive and credible to a jury because of its
independently strong credibility and the new witnesses' Hispanic/Mexican background.

The Defendant is justified in using force that is likely to cause death or serious bodily
harm "if he . . . reasonably believes that force is necessary to prevent death or serious bodily
injury to himself or a third person as a result of the other's imminent use of unlawful force."
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 76-2-402(1) (1995). Because the newly-discovered evidence would directly

support the reasonableness of the Defendant's belief that deadly force was necessary to prevent
death or serious bodily injury to himself, a different result is probable if the evidence were
presented to the jury.
The newly-discovered evidence was not reasonably discoverable prior to or during the
trial, and cannot be considered merely cumulative. A different result is reasonably probable and
this Court should grant the Defendant's motion for new trial based on this crucial new evidence.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT PLAINLY AND PREJUDICIALLY ERRED WHEN IT
FAILED TO INSTRUCT THE JURY REGARDING A LESSER-INCLUDED
OFFENSE
A.

Defendant Was Entitled To A Lesser Offense Instruction On The Elements
Of Manslaughter And The Evidence Presented Provides A Rational Basis
For The Instruction

Defendant was entitled to an instruction regarding a lesser-included offense because he
presented the court his proposed instruction and there was evidence supporting the instruction.
(R. at 113; Add B). The elements of manslaughter overlap those of criminal homicide and there
was considerable evidence presented which would support a conviction of the lesser-included
offense of manslaughter. The Utah Supreme Court has stated that:
When the elements of two offenses overlap . . . , if there is a
sufficient quantum of evidence to raise a jury question regarding a
lesser offense, then the court should instruct the jury regarding the
lesser offense. Similarly, when the evidence is ambiguous and
therefore susceptible to alternative interpretations, and one
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alternative would permit acquittal of the greater offense and
conviction of the lesser, a jury question exists and the court must
give a lesser included offense instruction at the request of the
defendant.
State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152, 159 (Utah 1983) (emphasis added).1
Thus, where, as in this case, the elements of manslaughter and criminal homicide overlap
and the evidence was ambiguous and susceptible to alternative interpretations, the trial court was
required to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense. So long as the evidence presented at
trial supported the possibility of a guilty finding on the lesser-included offense, the Defendant
was entitled to a lesser offense instruction and failure to give such an instruction was plain and
prejudicial error.
In Baker, the court relied on several other cases, including United States Supreme Court
cases, to reach its holding. Citing to Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 633 (1980), this Court
stated that "[b]y having the jury instructed regarding a lesser included offense, the defendant is
afforded the full benefit of the reasonable doubt standard." Baker, 671 P.2d at 156. Also
quoting Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, 212-13 (1973), this Court stated:
[I]t is no answer to petitioner's demand for a jury instruction on a
lesser offense to argue that a defendant may be better off without
such an instruction. True, if the prosecution has not established
beyond a reasonable doubt every element of the offense charged,
and if no lesser offense instruction is offered, the jury must, as a

Subsequent Utah cases have interpreted this language to require a two step analysis
whenever a defendant requests a lesser offense instruction. First of all, the trial court must
determine whether the statutory elements of the greater and lesser included offenses overlap to
some degree. Secondly, the court must determine if a "rational basis" exists for a verdict
acquitting the defendant of the greater offense charged and convicting him of the lesser offense.
See State v. Velarde, 134 P.2d 449, 451 (Utah 1986); State v. Hansen, 734 P.2d 421, 424 (Utah
1986).

theoretical matter, return a verdict of acquittal. But a defendant is
entitled to a lesser offense instruction ... precisely because he
should not be exposed to the substantial risk that the jury's practice
will diverge from theory. Where one of the elements of the offense
charged remains in doubt, but the defendant is plainly guilty of
some offense, the jury is likely to resolve its doubts in favor of
conviction.
Baker, 671 P.2d at 156-57 (emphasis added).
The Utah Supreme Court has more recently reiterated the limited discretion of the trial
court when there is any evidence to support a lesser offense instruction. "[T]he court must give
an instruction reflecting the defendant's theory of the case unless the evidence in support thereof
was so slight that all reasonable people would have to conclude against the defendant on that
point." State v. Piansiaksone, 954 P.2d 861, 871 (Utah 1998) (citing State v. Harding, 635 P.2d
33, 34) (Utah 1981) (emphasis added). This Court went on to say that "[a] defendant is entitled
to have his legal theory of the case placed before the jury if it would not be superfluous to do so
because of an absence of any evidence to support the theory." Id. (quoting State v. Standiford,
769 P.2d 254, 266 (Utah 1988)).
In applying this standard, the trial court injury cases is not allowed to weigh the
credibility of the evidence offered by the defendant in support of his request for a lesser-included
offense instruction. See Baker, 671 P.2d at 159; accord, State v. Velarde, 12>A P.2d 449, 451
(Utah 1986). "To allow otherwise would impinge upon the defendant's right to have the jury
decide the issues of fact." Velarde, 734 P.2d at 451 (citing State v. Oldroyd, 685 P.2d 551, 555
(Utah 1984)). It is the court's responsibility to "determine only whether there is a sufficient
quantum of evidence presented to justify charging the jury with a defendant's requested
instruction." Id. (citing Baker, 671 P.2d at 159). Finally, the trial court "must view the evidence

and the inferences that can be drawn from it in the light most favorable to the defendant." Id.
(citing State v. Crick, 675 P.2d 527, 532) (Utah 1983).
Once it is established that a defendant was entitled to a lesser offense instruction, an
appellate court must determine whether the failure to give the instruction was merely harmless
error or whether the error was in fact prejudicial or substantial. See State v. Hansen, 734 P.2d
421, 427 (Utah 1986). An error is substantial or prejudicial if "there is a reasonable likelihood
that in its absence there would have been a different result." Id. at 427-28 (citations omitted).
Applying this standard to the facts of this case illustrates that the trial court committed
plain and prejudicial error and Defendant's motion for new trial should be granted. The
Defendant formally submitted a requested instruction on the lesser-included offense of
manslaughter at the conclusion of the trial. (R. at 113.) Furthermore, the Defendant's counsel
argued at the conclusion of the State's case that there was not sufficient evidence presented to
support a conviction for criminal homicide and that, at the most, the evidence supported a
conviction of manslaughter. (Trial Tr. of 9/2/93 at 1-3.) Finally, the elements of manslaughter
and criminal homicide clearly overlap and this Court has previously held that manslaughter is a
lesser-included offense of intentional murder.
The State argued below that Defendant had "waived" the giving of the instruction. There
is no support for that assertion on the record at the trial. Moreover, in his motion for a new trial,
Defendant denied the assertion and affirmed that he never knowingly waived the giving of the
submitted lesser-included offense instruction. (R. at 786, 1013). The record shows that the
instruction was submitted and requested. (R. 113). Defendant was entitled to have it given.
5afer,671P.2datl59.

Secondly, even though only a "quantum" of evidence is required, there was significant
evidence, indeed the Defendant's entire defense, that Defendant stabbed Lopez only in selfdefense after being knocked to the ground by Lopez. The Defendant and others testified that
Lopez was the aggressor in both altercations. Lopez promised to make Whiteman a "dead man."
(Trial Tr. 9/2/93 at 110.) Lopez smashed the Defendant so hard in the face that he fell down and
a gash opened in his face. (Trial Tr. 8/30/93 at 214-15, 225-26, 257-58; 9/2/93 at 114-16, 199201, 227-28.) Other evidence showed that Mexican Nationals in groups severely beat (e.g. "ratpacked") others in the Park and that Lopez was accompanied by his backup during the
confrontation.
This evidence supported the Defendant's theory of this case and his reasonable belief that
he was imminently in danger of severe bodily harm and death. Certainly, this is a "sufficient
quantum" of evidence upon which a jury may reasonably have acquitted the Defendant of
intentional murder and convicted him instead of manslaughter. Hence, because the Defendant
requested the lesser offense instruction and the record indicates that both prongs of the Baker test
have been met, it was error for the trial court not to give the jury instruction (Add.B) as
submitted and requested.
B.

Even If Defendant Did Not Request A Lesser Offense Instruction, He Is
Entitled To Such Instruction

The trial court's failure to instruct the jury regarding a lesser-included offense was plain
and prejudicial error even if the instruction was determined not requested. As this Court stated in
Baker, "[t]o expect a jury ... to find a defendant innocent and thereby set him free when the
evidence establishes beyond doubt that he is guilty of some ... crime requires of our juries clinical
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detachment from the reality of human experience " Baker, 671 P 2d at 157 (quoting Beck v
Alabama, AA1 U.S 625, 642 (1980) (emphasis added). Due to the amount and credibility of
evidence supporting the Defendant's theory of the case, there is more than a "reasonable
likelihood" that the jury would have reached a different result—acquitting the Defendant of
intentional murder and convicting him of the alternative lesser offense of manslaughter.
As previously noted, the State has argued that the Defendant failed to request a lesser
offense instruction because Defendant's counsel, off the record during a break in the trial,
supposedly told the judge that Defendant would not request the instruction. Such a postconviction assertion is insufficient to show a waiver. (Moffat Aff, R. at 888.) Even assuming,
arguendo, that this is true, in order to waive a known right, the waiver by Defendant must be
made distinctly and on the record. This Court has stated that "[a] waiver is the intentional
relinquishment of a known right. To constitute waiver, there must be an existing right, benefit or
advantage, a knowledge of its existence, and an intention to relinquish it." Soter's, Inc. v.
DeseretFed. Sav. & Loan Assoc, 857 P.2d 935, 942 (Utah 1993) (citation omitted).
Furthermore, "the intent to relinquish a right must be distinct." Id.2 In applying this standard,
the court must look at "the totality of circumstances" to determine if the facts establish a distinct
intent to waive a known right. Id.
Under the totality of the circumstances here, the Defendant did not knowingly waive his
right to a lesser offense instruction. To the contrary, the evidence of record indicates that the

2

Webster defines "distinctly" as "separately, not confusedly, without a blending or
merging of one thing with another, clearly, obviously, unequivocally, decidedly." Soter's, 857
P.2d at 941 (citation omitted).

Defendant in fact requested and submitted a proposed lesser offense instruction. (R. at 113.)
Defendant's counsel argued specifically on record that the State's evidence did not support a
verdict of intentional murder and instead, at most, could support a verdict of manslaughter.
(Trial Tr. 9/2/93 at 1-3.) Most importantly, Defendant denied the assertion that he waived the
giving of a lesser-included offense instruction, stating that his counsel never even discussed the
issue with him. (R. at 786-1013.)
The record at trial is silent as to any supposed waiver. Given the evidence on the record,
the State's reliance on a supposed and disputed waiver off the record, clearly does not manifest a
distinct intent by Defendant to relinquish the right to the jury instruction. Here, the trial record is
void of evidence that shows a distinct, intentional waiver of the right to the lesser offense
instruction. The Defendant proffered evidence that any waiver discussion with his counsel
regarding the lesser-included offense instruction never occurred — at least not with his
understanding or approval. (R. at 1013.)
Even if this Court finds that the Defendant did not request the lesser-included offense
instruction, language from our courts and others suggests that a criminal defendant is entitled to a
lesser offense instruction, whether requested or not, so long as the evidence provides a rational
basis for such an instruction. The language of both Baker and Piansiaksone, quoted herein, is
mandatory. Baker, 671 P.2d at 159; Piansiaksone, 954 P.2d at 871. In Baker, the Utah Supreme
Court asserted that the United States Supreme Court stopped just short "of declaring that the
defendant's right to have the jury instructed on a lesser included offense is guaranteed by the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment." Baker, 671 P.2d at 157. The court suggested that the
only limitation on the right to a lesser offense instruction was the evidence itself, stating "the

defendant's right to a lesser included offense instruction [is not] absolute or unqualified. ... The
defendant's right to a lesser included offense instruction is limited by the evidence presented at
trial." Id. Furthermore, quoting Keeble v. United States, All U.S. at 208, the court stated that "it
is now beyond dispute that the defendant is entitled to an instruction on a lesser included offense
if the evidence would permit a jury rationally to find him guilty of the lesser offense and acquit
of the greater." Id. at 158.
Thus, this language suggests that even if the Defendant did not request a lesser offense
instruction, he is entitled to the instruction so long as the evidence provides a rational basis for it.
Certainly, due process requires more than an argued waiver supported only by a silent record at
trial. Waiver of a criminal defendant's constitutional rights must be clear and unequivocal. State
v. Genovesi, 871 P.2d 547, 551 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). A waiver that is not on the record is
neither clear nor unequivocal.
There must be sufficient evidence on the record to demonstrate Defendant's distinct,
unequivocal waiver. Considering the record before this Court that the Defendant did in fact
submit a lesser offense instruction, such a waiver cannot be presumed.
Defendant was constitutionally entitled to the requested instruction. The trial court
committed substantial and prejudicial error in failing to instruct the jury regarding the lesser
included offense of manslaughter and in refusing to grant a new trial for its failure to include the
instruction. This Court should reverse and grant a new trial, requiring such a lesser offense
instruction.

III.

[F DEFENDANT'S NEW EVIDENCE WAS NOT "NEWLY DISCOVERED" OR
THE LESSER OFFENSE INSTRUCTION WAS NOT REQUESTED, THEN
DEFENDANT WAS DENIED THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF TRIAL
COUNSEL
Defendant's counsel failed to provide effective assistance of counsel as guaranteed by the

Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. The Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal
defendant the right to effective assistance of counsel. See U.S. CONST. Amend. VI. To establish
that Defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel, he must show two factors: "[(!)] that
his counsel 'rendered deficient performance which fell below an objective standard of reasonable
professional judgment,' and [(2)] that 'counsel's deficient performance prejudiced him.'" State
v. Maestas, 984 P.2d 376, 379 (Utah 1999) (quoting, State v. Chacon, 962 P.2d 48, 50 (Utah
1998)).3 In order to satisfy the first part of this test, the Defendant must identify "specific acts or
omissions that fell outside the wide range of professional assistance." Id. (quoting Chacon, 962
P.2d at 50). Secondly, the Defendant must show that the defense attorneys' acts or omissions
prejudiced him in that "absent those acts or omissions, there is a 'reasonable probability' of a
more favorable result." Id. (quoting Chacon, 962 P.2d at 50).
Whether the Defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel is reviewed by this
court de novo. See State v. Perry, 899 P.2d 1232, 1239 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). This Court
should assess "the totality of the evidence taking into account such factors as whether the errors
affect the entire evidentiary picture or have an isolated effect and how strongly the verdict is
supported by the record." Id. (quoting State v. Hovater, 914 P.2d 37, 39-40 (Utah 1996)).

3

This two-part test was originally established by the United States Supreme Court in
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
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Moreover, the two-part Strickland test, "do[es] not establish mechanical rules." State v.
Classon, 935 P.2d 524, 533 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696).
"Instead, these principles 'are guides to the ultimate focus upon the fundamental fairness of the
proceeding challenged,' ... because '[t]he purpose of the inquiry is simply to insure that
defendant receives a fair trial.'" Id. (quoting State v. Frame, 723 P.2d 401, 405 (Utah 1986);
accord Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 696. Therefore, even if the Defendant fails to meet both
requirements of the test, "[t]he benchmark forjudging any claim of ineffectiveness must be
whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that
the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result." Classon, 935 P.2d at 533 (quoting
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686).
A.

Specific Acts And Omissions Of Counsel That Fall Below A Reasonable
Standard of Professional Judgment
1.

Counsel's failure to investigate

As illustrated by the evidence discovered subsequent to the conclusion of the trial, there
were several eyewitnesses that would have testified favorably to the Defendant at trial had
counsel investigated who these individuals were and interviewed them.
To the extent that Defendant's trial counsel may have had access to the medical
examiner's report, (Add. A), counsel did not reasonably investigate, disclose or present the
evidence that Lopez's tattoos affiliated him with the "Surenos" gang, one of the most violent
street gangs in Utah. (Aff, R. at 794-5.)
Counsel failed to discover the significance on Lopez's body of tattoos indicating Lopez
was indeed involved in a dangerous street gang known as the "Surenos." Such evidence was

readily available to counsel (or should have been). Such evidence would have confirmed the
reasonableness of Defendant's belief that Lopez in reality had back up on that day.
Prior to trial, on August 6, 1993, Defendant's investigator recovered tapes of witnesses
but the sound quality was so poor that there was nothing gained therefrom. Apparently, nothing
was ever done by counsel to follow up on this information regarding important eye witnesses.
(R. 561.)

Counsel also failed to follow-up with and investigate Bernard Townes, who

would have supported Defendant's testimony that two Mexicans approached the Defendant and
that the other wore a red shirt and cap. (R. at 519-20.) Counsel never requested or obtained from
the State the original statements of witnesses Elizabeth Woods or Harry Lee. Counsel also failed
to discover, interview and investigate Gilmore Francis Pinelo, Lopez's backup in his assault on
the Defendant. After the trial, Pinelo admitted to the Defendant while in jail that he had been
asked by Lopez to back him up and help him "down" the Defendant. (R. at 1014-15.)
Counsel also failed to investigate and discover Julian Valdez. Valdez was present in
Pioneer Park on April 26, 1993 and would testify that he also was asked by Lopez to back him
up while he attempted to "down" or "kill" the Defendant. (R. at 800-06, 810, 846, 858.) As
Hispanic, Valdez would have provided convincing testimony that Lopez was frequently involved
in fights with weapons, and was a known, reputed aggressive trouble-maker, (R. at 834, 848-50),
thus making Defendant's justification of self-defense more credible. That evidence from an
Hispanic would have been far more influential than if presented by an "Anglo" witness.
Counsel also failed to discover and/or offer the testimony of William Shultz and Charles
Drake, who would have corroborated defense evidence, contradicting prosecution claim that
Lopez acted alone and was not supported by "backup." (R. at 521-22.) Mr. Drake would have
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testified that there were numerous Mexican guys against the Defendant on April 26, 1993. (R. at
524.)
Importantly, counsel failed to investigate and discover that Robert Young, the State's key
eyewitness charged with driving under the influence, had received a lighter punishment by the
State in exchange for his favorable testimony. Young was the only State's witness in the Park
that provided the eyewitness evidence, albeit weak, suggesting that the Defendant intended to
stab and kill Lopez. Any remaining evidence of Defendant's intent hinges on mere inference.
2.

Counsel's failure to request a lesser-included offense instruction

Defendant has shown the critical need of the lesser-included offense instruction. If, as the
State argues, the instruction was not requested or was waived, then trial counsel failed to protect
Defendant's right thereto. Such a failure certainly falls below any reasonable standard of
professional judgment and cannot be said to be a rational trial strategy given the Defendant's
theory defense in his case.
3,

Counsel's failure to present mitigating evidence at trial

As noted, defense counsel failed to investigate or present any evidence whatsoever
regarding Lopez's group or gang affiliation, despite being asked to do so by Defendant.
Furthermore, counsel did not submit any evidence of Defendant's mental and emotional
deficiencies, nor of his organic mental disorders which were substantiated by the Dr. Ralph W.
Gant, who evaluated the Defendant on April 8 and 9, 1993. (R. at 789-90.) This information
demonstrated that Defendant suffered bi-polar disorders, and would have bolstered his selfdefense evidence, by showing that he did not have the necessary intent for homicide. Dr. Gant's

report is attached as Add. F.

Defendant was not even allowed access to his private papers,

including this Gant report, at trial. (R. at 786-87.)
4.

Failure to properly and adequately cross examine prosecution
witnesses Young and Woods

Defendant's counsel utterly failed to adequately cross examine and confront Defendant's
accusers on clear inconsistencies in their testimonies and matters that would have seriously
undermined their credibility. For example, at a preliminary hearing, Ms. Woods testified that
Lopez was the aggressor and that Defendant pushed Lopez with both hands on the shoulders. (R.
at 785-86.) This testimony is completely inconsistent with Ms. Woods' testimony at trial.
Moreover, Mr. Young had apparently made previous statements to the police and his
inconsistencies were not presented at trial. Furthermore, if evidence of Mr. Young's leniency
was known or available to defense counsel, it should have been brought to the attention of the
jury to impeach his credibility.
B.
These Acts Or Omissions Clearly Fell Below Any Reasonable Standard Of
Professional Judgment
Considering Defendant's actions in self defense, defense counsels' failure to investigate,
their failure to request a lesser offense instruction and failure to present mitigating evidence fell
far outside the range of reasonable professional assistance. While it might suggest that refusal to
investigate or to present the evidence supporting self-defense may have been a reasonable trial
tactic, these failures reach the heart of Defendant's defense and cannot be considered reasonable
tactic. The Utah Supreme Court was faced with this very issue in State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182
(Utah 1990). In Templin, the defendant had argued that his counsel failed to adequately
investigate the availability of prospective witnesses. Id. at 185. Despite having ample time and
100735 SA512 001
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resources to investigate the availability of witnesses and the substance of their testimonies,
defendant's counsel did not contact several potential witnesses. Id. at 187. The Court held that
defense counsel's failure to investigate failed both prongs of the Strickland test and remanded the
case for a new trial. Id. at 188-89.
In its analysis, this Court stated:
If counsel does not adequately investigate the underlying facts of
the case, including the availability of prospective defense
witnesses, counsel's performance cannot fall within the "wide
range of reasonable professional assistance," This is because a
decision not to investigate cannot be considered a tactical decision.
It is only after an adequate inquiry has been made that counsel can
make a reasonable decision to call or not to call particular
witnesses for tactical reasons.
Id. at 187 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686) (emphasis added).
Similarly, unless Defendant's counsel investigated the availability and substance of the
later discovered witnesses, he could not have made any kind of tactical decision regarding the
evidence. The record is void of any evidence which would indicate that Defendant's counsel
made any investigation into the availability of the later discovered witnesses, the evidence
impeaching Mr. Young, or the evidence of Lopez' tattoos indicating gang affiliation. Such
evidence goes to the heart of the Defendant's defense. Hence, this failure fell below any standard
of reasonable professional assistance.
Furthermore, if counsel failed to request a lesser offense instruction, such a failure also
fell outside the standard of reasonable assistance. Defendant's entire theory was that he stabbed
Lopez in self-defense. In other words, he had committed manslaughter, not intentional murder.
Again, refusal to request that instruction cannot be considered a reasonable tactical decision. As

this Court stated in Baker, "[t]o expect a jury ... to find a defendant innocent and thereby set him
free when the evidence establishes beyond doubt that he is guilty of some ... crime requires of our
juries clinical detachment from the reality of human experience." Baker, 671 P.2d at 157
(quoting Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 642 (1980) (emphasis added).
Finally, counsel's failure to introduce mitigating evidence at trial and sentencing likewise
fell below the reasonable standard of professional assistance. The introduction of the mitigating
evidence could have resulted in the Defendant receiving a lesser sentence, or even in his
acquittal. It is elementary that a criminal defendant's counsel should introduce any and all
evidence that may mitigate the circumstances of his client. Thus, failure to do so falls below the
standard of reasonableness.
C.

Defense Counsel's Acts Or Omissions Prejudiced The Defendant

As mentioned, supra, in order to show Defendant was prejudiced by the acts or omissions
of counsel, he must illustrate that "absent those acts or omissions, there is a 'reasonable
probability' of a more favorable result." Maestas, 984 P.2d at 379 (quoting Chacon, 962 P.2d at
50). The evidence that would have been discovered had counsel conducted a reasonable
investigation goes to the very heart of the Defendant's defense and would have bolstered the
defense significantly. This Court held in Templin that counsel's failure to investigate mere
credibility testimony regarding the credibility of the rape victim prejudiced the defendant
sufficiently such that the Court felt that had counsel discovered the evidence, there was a
reasonable probability of a different result. See Templin, 805 P.2d at 188-89.
In this case, counsel failed not only investigated evidence of the credibility of Mr. Young,
the State's key eyewitness, but also the substance and availability of testimony of several other

eyewitnesses and the existence of Lopez' gang affiliation. Given the Defendant's theory of the
case, the strength of the evidence not brought forward, and the evidence that was presented to the
jury, there is a strong possibility of a different result in the case. There is more than a reasonable
likelihood that the jury may have found that the Defendant did in fact act in self-defense.
Therefore, the two prongs of the Strickland test have been met and the Defendant was denied his
constitutional right to effective counsel. Thus, this case should be remanded for a new trial.
D.

Even If The Strickland Test Was Not Met, Defendant Was Not Given A Fair
Trial As A Result Of Counsel's Acts And Omissions

Defendant's ineffective counsel undermined the entire adversarial process in the trial and,
as a result, Defendant was not able to present all exculpatory evidence and receive a fair trial. As
the Utah Court of Appeals has stated that "[t]he purpose of the inquiry is simply to insure that
defendant receives a fair trial." Classon, 935 P.2d at 533 (quoting Frame, 723 P.2d at 405).
"The benchmark forjudging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so
undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as
having produced a just result." Id, (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686).
In this case, because the jury was not able to hear the crucial evidence which counsel
neglected to investigate, it could not have reached a just result. Only after weighing all the
evidence could a jury make a determination as to Defendant's guilt or innocence. Moreover,
where counsel failed to request a lesser offense jury instruction, he was essentially asking the
jury to depart from the reality of human experience. The Defendant stabbed Lopez. There was
no question about that. There was a question, however, as to whether the Defendant acted in
self-defense—the very concept of the lesser-included offense instruction. Thus, to neglect to

request the instruction clearly deprived the Defendant of a fair trial. Finally, counsel's failure to
provide the court with all relevant mitigating factors, both during trial and sentencing, resulted in
the court finding that the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors. This failure also
resulted in the Defendant receiving an unjust result.
Therefore, because the Defendant was deprived of his constitutionally protected right to
effective assistance of counsel, this case should be remanded for a new trial so that a jury can
hear all the evidence that should, and could, have been presented.
IV.

THE STATE'S FAILURE TO DISCLOSE SIGNIFICANT
EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE SEVERELY UNDERMINES CONFIDENCE
IN THE JURY VERDICT

The State had a duty to disclose all evidence that might be exculpatory to the Defendant.
Its failure to disclose a significant amount of exculpatory evidence resulted in substantial
prejudice to the Defendant. In State v. Carter; 707 P.2d 657, 662 (Utah 1985), this Court stated
that "due process requires a prosecutor to disclose even unrequested information which is or may
be exculpatory." See also State v. Bakalov, 979 P.2d 799, 811 (Utah 1999) (explaining that
failure to disclose evidence favorable to the defense "violates due process where the evidence is
material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the
prosecution") (quoting Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963)). The test of whether the
evidence is material "is not whether the defendant would have been acquitted had the evidence
been disclosed, but whether the prosecutor's suppression 'undermines confidence in the outcome
of the trial.'" Id. at 812 (quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 678 (1985)). Moreover,
once constitutional error has been found, "there is no need for further harmless-error review."
Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 435 (1995) (once a Bagley error has been shown, it cannot
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subsequently be found harmless). Finally, suppressed evidence must be "considered collectively,
not item by item." Id. at 436. Thus, even if there was merely a possibility that the evidence
would be exculpatory and even if it was not requested, the State was required to provide such
evidence to the Defendant if the cumulative effect of the evidence undermines confidence in the
outcome of the trial.
Moreover, this Court has held that because of the silence on the record involving
wrongful failure to disclose evidence, the burden is on the State to persuade a court that the
failure did not unfairly prejudice the Defendant. See State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 921 (Utah
1987) (stating that "when the defendant can make a credible argument that the prosecutor's
errors have impaired the defense, it is up to the State to persuade the court that there is no
reasonable likelihood that absent the error, the outcome of the trial would have been more
favorable for the defendant.") Here, because the Defendant has made a credible argument that
the prosecutor's failure to disclose exculpatory evidence impaired the defense, the burden is on
the State to persuade this Court that absent the error there is not a reasonable likelihood of a
favorable result for the Defendant.
Applying these legal standards to this case, Mr. Whiteman was not provided with a
significant amount of evidence that, when considered collectively, severely undermines
confidence in the jury verdict convicting him. The suppressed evidence included the following
items: (1) evidence of Lopez' gang affiliation as evidenced by the tattoos on his body found by
the State's employees; (2) the name and statement of an individual (Pinelo) who accompanied
Lopez during the altercation with Mr. Whiteman; (3) statements from other eyewitnesses such as
William Schultz, Bernard Towns, and Charles Drake who all offered statements which supported

the defense theory of self-defense; and (4) the fact that Mr. Robert Young, the prosecution's key
witness, was charged with driving under the influence shortly before the Defendant's trial and
was given a deal by the State in exchange for his favorable testimony against the Defendant.
While any one of the items of evidence, by itself, may not have undermined confidence in
the result of Mr. Whiteman's trial, when considered collectively, the evidence leads to the
conclusion that there is a reasonable probability of a different result had the evidence been
properly presented to the jury. This is especially true in light of the defense theory—that Lopez
had a history of gang violence; that Lopez was often involved in fights involving weapons and
resulting in serious injury; that Lopez was accompanied by other gang members that were there
to help him in his altercation with the Defendant; and that because of these facts, Mr. Whiteman
reasonably feared he was in danger of serious bodily harm or death when he stabbed the victim.
Furthermore, because all of the undisclosed evidence was exculpatory, the State had a duty to
disclose it, regardless of whether it was requested or not.
The State cannot show that there is not a reasonable likelihood of a different result.
Moreover, it cannot be alleged that the failure to disclose the above-mentioned evidence was
merely harmless error. Mr. Whiteman has established a legitimate constitutional error, which
cannot be considered harmless. See Kyles, 514 U.S. at 435. As the court in Kyles stated:
[Confidence that the verdict would have been unaffected cannot
survive when suppressed evidence would have entitled a jury to
find that the eyewitnesses were not consistent in describing the
killer, that two out of the four eyewitnesses testifying were
unreliable, that the most damning physical evidence was subject to
suspicion, that the investigation that produced it was insufficiently
probing, and that the principal police witness was insufficiently
informed or candid.

Id at 454.
For these reasons, the State failed in its duty to disclose exculpatory evidence to the
defense, which failure undermines confidence in the jury verdict and Mr. Whiteman is, therefore,
entitled to a new trial
V,

DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION SHOULD BE OVERTURNED BECAUSE
THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT'S INTENT TO
COMMIT CRIMINAL HOMICIDE MURDER
Given the substantial amount of evidence indicating Defendant acted in self-defense on

April 26, 1993, the jury could not have found beyond reasonable doubt that Defendant possessed
the intent to commit criminal homicide. The Utah Supreme Court has stated that a conviction
should be reversed due to insufficient evidence "when the evidence is so inconclusive or so
inherently improbable that 'reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt5 that the
defendant committed the crime." State v. Goddard, 871 P.2d 540, 543 (Utah 1994) (quoting State
v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983)).
In this case, there was no direct evidence at trial that Defendant intended to commit
criminal homicide. Rather, the evidence of Defendant's intent was purely circumstantial. Under
such circumstances, when a conviction is based solely on circumstantial evidence, this Court
should review the evidence to determine:
(1) whether there is any evidence that supports each and every
element of the crime charged, and (2)whether the inferences that
can be drawn from that evidence have a basis in logic and
reasonable human experience sufficient to prove each legal
element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. A guilty verdict
is not legally valid if it is based solely on inferences that give rise
to only remote or speculative possibilities of guilt.

State v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337, 344 (Utah 1997) (quoting State v. Workman, 852 P.2d 981,
985)(Utah 1993). Hence, the "fabric of evidence against the defendant must cover the gap
between the presumption of innocence and the proof of guilt." State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443,
444-45 (Utah 1983). Given the overwhelming evidence of Defendant's self-defense, it was not
possible that the jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant possessed the
requisite intent to commit criminal homicide.
The following evidence of self-defense was presented to the jury:
1.

Defendant testified that he had been involved in more than one prior confrontation

with Lopez and that Lopez was the aggressor in each of the confrontations. (Trial Tr. 9/2/93 at
92-116.) This testimony was corroborated by the State's witness, Clifton Jones, who testified
that Lopez approached the Defendant on both occasions to which there was no contrary evidence.
(Trial Tr. 9/1/93 at 203.)
2.

The Defendant testified and corroborated by the testimony of other witnesses,

including State witnesses, that immediately prior to the stabbing incident, Lopez had punched the
Defendant so hard that it caused him to fall to the ground and opened a wound in the Defendant's
head. (Trial Tr. 8/31/93 at 214-15; 225-26; 257-58; 9/2/93 at 114-16; 199-201; 227-28.) Even
the testimony of Robert Young supports the assertion that Lopez's hands went up only after
Whiteman had stabbed him.
3.

Evidence at trial indicated that Lopez was renown for his violent character and

very often instigated similar confrontations which resulted in serious injury. Clifton Jones
characterized Lopez as "rowdy" and testified that he had seen Lopez in other fights where Lopez
used weapons against other people that did not have weapons. (Trial Tr. 9/1/93 at 196, 218.)
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Lopez was also described as "violent," "erratic," "belligerent," "pushy" and a "troublemaker,"
and he and his companions had severely beaten others on at least two different occasions. (Trial
Tr. 9/2/93 at 24-28, 220-23.) Notwithstanding this "Anglo" evidence of Lopez, the jury should
also be allowed to hear the persuasive testimony from Hispanics regarding Lopez's violence and
his backup support in the Park that day.
4.

The record also shows a pattern of group crime in Pioneer Park—evidence going

directly to the reasonableness of the Defendant's belief that he was going to be ambushed. (Trial
Tr. 9/2/93 at 107-15.) The record paints a vivid picture of illegal groups acting together to
support one another in fights or drug deals. (Trial Tr. 9/1/93 at 195-200; 9/2/93 at 78, 193.)
Since the events in this trial, society has now monitored this activity as gang-related. (Add. C, R.
793-5.)
5.

After Lopez was stabbed, the Defendant was immediately pursued by Lopez's

group of 15 to 20 men who chased him with bottles, rocks and a metal fence post, inflicting
serious bodily injury on the Defendant. (Trial Tr. 8/31/93 at 247; Trial Tr. 9/1/93 at 185-86.)
6.

The reasonableness of the Defendant's belief that he was in danger of serious

injury is further supported by the Defendant's own knowledge and experience of the goings on at
Pioneer Park. The Defendant had seen "guns, knives, brass knuckles, etc . . . " in the park. (Trial
Tr. 9/2/93 at 74.) He knew of several instances of others being severely beaten by gangs of
Mexican Nationals similar to the one pursuing him. (Trial Tr. 9/2/93 at 84-85.) Furthermore, at
least two other witnesses confirmed having seen such weapons in the Park and that anyone was
subject to the beatings of these gangs. (Trial Tr. 9/1/93 at 197, 216; Trial Tr. 9/2/93 at 192-95,

203.) Mitchell Cane testified that he had two friends who were severely beaten, to the point of
broken bones, by a gang of at least five. (Trial Tr. 9/2/93 at 223-25.)
Given the substantial amount of evidence presented to the jury regarding the conditions in
Pioneer Park, the history of gang beatings and murders, the reputation of Lopez as a violent
trouble-maker, and the subjective knowledge and experiences of the Defendant, it cannot be said
that the prosecution proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the Defendant did not act in selfdefense after he was antagonized and hit in the face by Lopez. (See Jury Instruction No. 27, R. at
204.) Therefore, Defendant's conviction cannot stand.
CONCLUSION
Because of the nature and extent of the newly-discovered evidence, there is a strong
possibility that, had the jury been presented with the new evidence, they would have acquitted
Defendant. In addition, Defendant was constitutionally entitled to the requested jury instruction
regarding the lesser-included offense.
Several factors in this case demonstrate that the overall fairness in Defendant's trial was
lacking. For example, defense counsel committed several crucial and prejudicial errors throughout
the trial. In addition, the prosecution failed to disclose important exculpatory information, thus
depriving the Defendant of his constitutional right to present all available exculpatory evidence to
the trier of fact. Finally, due to the amount and nature of the evidence supporting self-defense
presented to the jury, no reasonable jury could have found that the State had met its burden of
proving, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Defendant did not in fact act in self-defense.
//
//
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Therefore, Defendant urges this Court to reverse his conviction and grant him a new trial in
order to present a trier of fact with all available exculpatory evidence.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 22nd day of December, 1999.
NIELSEN & SENIOR

Clark R. Nielsen
Eagle Gate Tower, Suite 1100
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Appellant Michael Whiteman
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ADDENDUM
A.

Medical Examiner's Report

B.

Instruction on lesser offense.

C.

Sgt. Chuck Gilbert Affidavit

D.

Defendants Affidavit for New Trial

E.

Defendants Affidavit #2

F.

Letter from Dr. Gant

ADDENDUM "A

Report of Examination
Name - LOPEZ, Jose Antonio Perez

Case No.-93-0476

Examination of the neck reveals a single needle puncture wounc on the right side of
the neck.
The chest and abdomen are normally developed and remarkable for evidence of injury
as described below. Tnere is evidence of medical therapy consisting of multiple EKG
monitoring pads and a 30 cm thoracotomy incision on the left side of the chest, just
below the level of the nipple. Associated with this incision is an opening in the
pericardium and suturing of the injured heart, as described below. In the left upper
chest are tattoos with an inscription "I (heart) AMBER", and a starburst pattern. No
scars are seen.
The upper extremities are symmetric, normally developed and remarkable for tattoos
on the lateral aspect of the right arm, consisting of the word 'TICK'' and "E". No tattoos
are seen on the left upper arm. A tattoo of the letters "SUR", "O" and a star, are present
on the dorsal aspect of the left elbow region. Examination of the antecubital fossae
reveals an intravenous catheter inserted in the right side. A single fresh needle
puncture w o u n d with surrounding contusion is seen in the left medial antecubital
fossa. There is an area of linear ropey scarring in the lateral left antecubital region, with
a single fresh needle puncture wound. Examination of the forearms reveals a tattoo of
an either stylized "H" or a cross with the ground beneath it on the anterior aspect of the
left forearm, proximally. The dorsum of the left hand has a tattoo of the letters '3AG".
Examination of the wrists reveals a 4.5 X 2 cm irregular scar on the lateral aspect of the
right w r i s t The dorsal aspect of the right wrist has a 2.5 X 1 cm scar. On the dorsum of
the right hand are two dot-like tattoos. At the base of the right index finger is a question
mark-shaped area of scarring measuring to 3.5 cm- Distaily, on the dorsal surface of the
right index finger, is a 1.5 cm scar. No scars are seen on the left hand. The hands are
received bagged and nail clippings are taken from both hands.
Examination of the lower extremities reveals intravenous catheters inserted in the
inguinal regions, bilaterally. There are injuries of the legs as described below. The
lateral superior aspect of the left knee has a 2 cm irregular scar. Just below and medial to
this is a 1.5 X 2 cm scar. About both ankles_are ID bracelets. No tattoos or edema are
seen. Examination of the feet reveals no abnormalities.
The back, a n u s and genitalia are without evidence of injury. The penis is
uncircumcised and a Folev catheter is inserted.

MEDICAL -XAHINER
STATE OF UTAH

* 1 9 3 0 4 7 6 N*m*: UNK,
UN IDENTIFIED HOfllCiuE
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ADDENDUM "B"

INSTRUCTION NO.

Should you find from the evidence that the defendant is
guilty of an offense included within the charge brought against
him, but you entertain a reasonable doubt as to the severity of
the offense committed, you are instructed to find the defendant
guilty of the lesser included offense only.

ADDENDUM "C

Clark R. Nielsen (2406)
HENRIOD & NIELSEN

Attorneys for Plaintiff
1160 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 -1004
Telephone: (801)322-0591
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

AFFIDAVIT OF
CHUCK GILBERT

Plaintiff,
vs.
MICHAEL WHITEMAN,
Defendant.

Civil No. 931900809FS
Judge William A. Thome

Affiant, Chuck Gilbert, being first duly sworn, deposes and states:
1.

I am a resident of Salt Lake County, Utah.

2.

I am a member of the Salt Lake City Metro Gang Unit.

3.

I have worked as a member of the Metro Gang Unit for two (2) years.

4.

In approximately 1989, a law enforcement gang project was initiated in the

Salt Lake City area in an attempt to deal with local gang issues and to increase public
awareness.
5.

Although this project made an immediate effort to educate the public-at-

large regarding gangs, it has only been in the last couple of years that the public has
become aware of the real threat of danger which gangs pose to this community.

6.

I have had extensive involvement with the local gangs and am familiar with

their symbols, signs and colors.
7.

I am aware of the gang known as "Surenos." This gang originated in

Southern California and has a large number of Mexican Nationals as members in the Salt
Lake City area.
8.

In the early 1990fs the Surenos gang was the largest and most active gang in

the Salt Lake City area. Yet, the presence of the Surenos gang in the Salt Lake City area
was not widely known to the public.
9.

The primary symbol of allegiance with the Surenos gang is "SUR."

Surenos gang members often have a tattoo of the symbol "SUR" on their bodies. They
also often mark their clothing with "SUR" and use this symbol in their graffiti.
10.

Another popular gang symbol is a five pointed star.

11.

Attached to this affidavit as Exhibit A is an excerpt regarding Surenos taken

from a manual entitled "Gang Intelligence Manual - Identifying and Understanding
Modern-Day Violent Gangs in the United States."
12.

Surenos Gang members are frequently violent and gang members have no

regard for their own lives and will provoke situations and confrontations that can result in
their own deaths to protect the "honor" of the gang and other members.
13.

Surenos gang members often involve themselves in a wide range of criminal

activity.
2
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A major illegal activity by gang members is drug trafficking. When selling

drugs, gang members often work in groups of three (3) to five (5) to provide backup
protection and to insure that the deals are successfully completed.
15.

Since 1989, Pioneer Park has been a popular place for gang members to

carry out drug deals.

Chuck Gilbert

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)
:ss
)

Charles Gilbert, being duly sworn, deposes and says: That he has read the
foregoing Affidavit and knows the contents thereof, and that the same is true of his own
knowledge, except as to those matters alleged on belief, and as to such, he reasonably
believes them to be true.
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this
1996.

Notary Public
NSEN|
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Surenos
Suf is the Spanish word meaning "south/ "Sureto* literally means "one from the south" or "southerner." When
these terms are used in Hispanic graffiti, they refer to
u
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Southern California.
Also, the number 13, as used by the Hlspanics, is synonymous with Sur and Surefto and also indicates the gang's origin in Southern California. There are several reasons for this.
Approximately three decades ago, when Hlspanics in the
California prisons began organizing into gangs, the Mexican
Mafia gang recruits were,forthe most part, inmates from the
Los Angeles area. The Mexican Mafia was also referred to as
La £me, which is Spanish for the letter M. Since the letter M
is the thirteenth letter of the alphabet, the Mexican Mafia
members used the number 13 synonymously with the letter
M. Also, the area code around the Los Angeles area is 213,
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ADDENDUM "D

Clark R. Nielsen (2406)
HENRIOD & NIELSEN

Attorneys for Defendant
1160 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1004
Telephone: (801) 322-0591
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

AFFIDAVIT OF
MICHAEL WHITEMAN

Plaintiff,

Civil No. 931900809FS

vs.

Judge William A. Thome

MICHAEL WHITEMAN,
Dpfpnrtant

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)
:ss
)

Michael Whiteman, being first duly sworn on oath, states and affirms:
1.

I am the defendant in this case. In September 1993,1 was convicted

of the murder of Jose Antonio Perez Lopez, and am presently incarcerated at the
Utah State Prison.
2.

I stabbed Mr. Lopez on April 26, 1993 after he attacked and struck

me. At that moment, I feared for my safety because of his attack, his threats and

his backup friends who were with him. I testified at trial to my fear, the reason for
my actions, and the events in Pioneer Park on that day.
3.

In June 1993, prior to my trial, I requested my defense counsel to

investigate Lopez's gang affiliations in support of my defense that I feared being
"rat packed" by a gang group and that I reasonably feared for my safety.
4.

To my knowledge, counsel did not make adequate investigation and

did not present any evidence at trial regarding Lopez's street gang affiliation with
the "Surenos" gang or other gang groups. Although my attorney had received the
medical report showing Lopez's gang tattoos, my attorneys did not present any
evidence regarding those tattoos or the full extent of Lopez's aliases and criminal
activity in Pioneer Park.
5.

Since my trial, I have obtained new evidence that Lopez was a

member of the "Surenos" street gang and was known by at least seventeen (17)
different aliases. His nickname was "Diablo" or "Devil". I am informed that
Lopez bore the tattoos of "S.U.R." and a star, which are gang symbols and I have
only recently been able to discover the meaning and identity of those symbols.
6.

I have obtained new evidence of the identity of one of the gang

members who was backing up Lopez in the Park on April 26, 1993. He is Gilmore
2

Francis Pinello. After my conviction, I met Pinello in jail, and he admitted to me
that he was backing up Lopez against me and was ready to join in Lopez's gang
attack on me. Mr. Pinello stated to me personally that he was the man wearing the
red shirt and backward cap, and struck me with the green steel fence post. Pinello
also told me that he was a gang member with Lopez. Because I met Pinello in jail
after my conviction, I do not know his present whereabouts.
7.

According to the testimony at trial, Mr. Pinello was interviewed by

an Officer Newman on April 26, 1993. However, the content of that interview and
the identity of Mr. Pinello were never disclosed to me or my counsel before the
trial.
8.

Also, the recorded statements of Julian Valdez, attached to my

memorandum, are new evidence supporting the reasonableness of my fear that I
was being attacked by a large gang, and that Lopez had backup.
9.

Prior to my trial, the State never produced the recorded statements of

Bernard Townes that Whiteman and he were approached by Lopez (in a white
shirt) and by a man in a red shirt and cap worn backward (Mr. Pinello).
10.

I was present at my preliminary hearing and, at that time, I heard

Elizabeth Woods, the State's witness, testify that she saw my struggle with Lopez.
3

She testified then that Mr. Lopez was the aggressor and that she saw the white
male (me) push the aggressor back with both hands on the shoulders. This
testimony was inconsistent with her testimony at trial. The transcript of her
preliminary hearing testimony and her police-recorded statement have not been
made available to me, even though I have personally requested them for my new
trial motion.
11.

At trial, my attorney requested the Court to give a lessor-included

offense instruction. The Court refused to give the instruction even though I
presented evidence that I reasonably feared for my safety. I testified that I was
threatened and was being attacked by not just Lopez, but also by his backup gang
members. Whether or not my actions were legally justified as self-defense, I
believe I was entitled to a lesser included offense instruction.
12.

On April 22, 1993, just four (4) days prior to the Pioneer Park attack,

I was given a diagnosis and report by Dr. Ralph W. Grant, a Salt Lake City
psychologist, showing that I suffered, among other things, organic mental disorder,
major depression and borderline intellectual functions. I told my attorneys of this
medical information regarding diminished capacity and/or mitigation. (A copy of
the doctor's written evaluation is attached hereto.) The report also verifies the
4

medication I was taking at that time. However, my attorneys did not present this
evidence either at trial or at my sentencing.
13.

Had I been able to present any of the foregoing evidence at trial, I

believe the evidence would have supported my self-defense defense and
reasonably would likely have made a difference to the jury.
14.

I ask the Court to grant me a new trial so that I can present new

evidence regarding Lopez's gang affiliations, that Lopez was the aggressor with
his gang companions, and to support my defense argument with evidence that was
not reasonably available to me, or presented by my attorneys, at trial.
15.

In the event that no new trial is granted, I request a resentencing

hearing at which I can present this evidence to show the reasonableness of my
fears and actions to mitigate my conviction and sentence.
Respectfully submitted this

. day of November, 1996.

Michael Whiteman

5

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)
:ss
)

Michael Whiteman, being duly sworn, deposes and says: That he is the
Defendant herein; that he has read the foregoing Affidavit and knows the
contents thereof, and that the same is true of his own knowledge, except as to
those matters alleged on belief, and as to such, he reasonably believes them to be
true.
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this
November, 1996.

StMofUtah

day of

Notary Pub

GREGGW^SBI
W5 South State #500
SdtUto City, Utah 64111
tyCommtoion Expires
JUy 25,1908
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ADDENDUM "E

Clark R. Nielsen (2406)
HENRIOD & NIELSEN

Attorneys for Plaintiff
\ I b(JJr^^'
1160 Eagle Gate Tower
V
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1004
Telephone: (801) 322-0591
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF
MICHAEL WHITEMAN

Plaintiff;
vs.

CivilNo.931900809FS

MICHAEL WHITEMAN,

Judge Michael R. Murphy

Defendant.

1
i

STATE OF UTAH

_ _ _

)

:ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)

Affiant, Michael Whiteman, beingfirstduly sworn, deposes and states:
1.

I am the Defendant in this case.

2.

My defense counsel, Mark Moffat and Richard Mauro, did not discuss with

me any strategy or decision not to ask the Court to give a lesser included offense
instruction.
3.

I did not receive the coroner's medical report regarding my case until

October, 1993 after my trial.

4.

Included in the paper work I received from my counsel in October, 1993

was a copy of the medical examiner's report. That was the first time I saw that report.
5.

Upon reviewing that report for the first time, I noticed that it showed a

tattoo "SUR" on the victim's arm. Although I had strongly suspected that the victim
belonged to a gang and had informed my counsel of my suspicions, the report was the
first physical evidence that I had that the deceased may have belonged to a gang.
6.

While I was incarcerated in the Salt Lake County Jail, I encountered

Gilmore Francis Pinnelo at the jail.
7.

Pinnelo was a "red shirt" trustee. He was mopping one day close to my cell

and I recognized him as the companion of the decedent who had held the green fence
post.
8.

Pinnelo confirmed to me that he was the individual with the fence post

when I questioned him.
9.

Pinnelo said the reason that he participated in the attack was because he

feared Lopez.
10.

I asked Pinnelo his name, but he would not tell me. He also told me that he

would not talk about the incident and that my attorneys could not contact him because he
feared retaliation by Lopez1 other backers.

SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF MICHAEL WHITEMAN
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11.

That same night, I asked an officer at the jail if I could see the pictures of

the red shirt trustees. The officer showed me these pictures. I recognized Pinello and
then learned that his name was Gihnore Francis Pinello. He was born on January 29,
1959 and he was incarcerated in the Salt Lake County jail on July 11, 1993.
\K

12.

I proiiidocfrmy trial attorneys^ll documentation^ my p

medical condition at the time of the incident* including Dr. Gant's report.

JL

DATED this / /

day of February, 1997.

22&

'/^^^<?_l/J2a<L4JL*{

Michael Whiteman
Defendant

SUBSCRIBED and sworn to before me this

ll

day of February, 1997.

GREGG T. CHWSTENSEN I

^ ^ \^-*^(V^

afl8jlgSg?,i J

Notary Public

tyCofmnistion Expires •
Stated Utah

J
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF
MICHAEL WHITEMAN was mailed first class, postage prepaid on the
of February 1997 to:
Paul Parker
Attorney for Plaintiff
231 East 400 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

\1L
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ADDENDUM "F

ASSOCIATED CLINICAL SERVICES
RALPH W. GANT, PH.D., PSYCHOLOGIST
807 EAST SOUTH TEMPLE, #104
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84102
(801) 521-0182

April 22, 1993
Division of Disability Determination Services
P.O. Box 45550
Salt Lake City, UT 84145
Attn: Disability Claims Examiner #826
Re: Claimant Michael B. Whiteman
SS# 557-78-3096
DOB 12-19-49
Claim #44395
Dear Claims Examiner #826:
Michael B. Whiteman is a forty-three year old single, homeless man
who was referred to this Clinic for a psychological evaluation by
his DHS worker, Ms. Kay Guerrero. He came to the Clinic on 04-0893, completing the testing and clinical interview on that date.
His history is elaborated in the attached Psychological Evaluation
Report completed on 04-09-93.
In addition to the report I have
attached a copy of the WAIS-R protocol, which as you can see,
describes Mr. Whitman as functioning in the borderline range of
intellectual ability.
Basically the psychograph indicates
significant deficits in long term memory, short term memory,
impulse control, judgement, abstract and logical thinking, ability
to attend to detail, capacity for memorization and visual motor
coordination. In addition to the WAIS-R protocol, I have attached
a copy of my mental status evaluation. From the mental status
evaluation you will note a significant history for alcohol abuse
and dependence as well as barbiturate, heroin, cannabis,
amphetamine, glue and cocaine dependence. Mr. Whitman was last
addicted to heroin approximately 28 months ago, according to his
self report.
Page 10 of the psychological evaluation report
provides the following diagnoses:
304.90 Polysubstance dependence, including severe alcohol
dependency.
292.90 Organic mental disorder NOS (provisional, suspected
from long term alcohol dependence reflected from the
results of IQ testing)
296.33 Major depression, moderate-severe, without psychotic
features evident.
301.83 Borderline personality disorder
V40.00 Borderline intellectual functioning (DSM III-R)

Thank you for yoiir inquiry regarding Mr, Whiteman. I trust that
this information will be helpful. Please feel free to call me if
yqu have any question related to this matter.
R^speptfully,

f

Ralph W. Gant,"Ni.D.
Psychologist, Lie. #316
RWG/am
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